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Nicholas of Autrecourt has been of interest to scholars primarily because 
of his place within the skeptical currents of fourteenth-century philosophy. 
However, just as there has been no general agreement about the nature 
of late medieval skepticism, there has been no agreement about where to 
locate Nicholas within it. Following Gilson's charge that Nicholas's attempt 
to dismantle Aristotelianism was a consequence of skeptical tendencies in 
Ockham's epistemology,' much debate has focused on Nicholas's criterion 
of evident knowledge and its relation to Ockham's doctrine of the intuitive 
cognition of nonexistents.2 But while this debate is as fascinating as it is 
important, it has had the unfortunate consequence of leading commen- 
tators to ignore other aspects of Nicholas's thought which are well deserv- 
ing of attention. This is particularly true in the case of his treatment of 
motion. In reducing all change to the locomotion of atoms, in positing 
an interstitial void, and in denying the infinite divisibility of the contin- 
uum, Nicholas both challenged Aristotelian physics at its most fundamen- 
tal level and separated himself from virtually all of his scholastic 
I would like to thank Norman Kretzmann, Steve Strange, and Stephen Brown 
for their helpful comments on various aspects of this article. 
1. For Gilson's treatment of Ockham and Nicholas, see Etienne Gilson, The 
Unity of Philosophical E@erience (New York: Scribner, 1937), pp. 61-103. 
2. See the debate between Philotheus Boehner, who argues, contra Gilson, 
that Ockham's doctrine is antiskeptical, and Anton Pegis, who defends Gilson's 
reading. Philotheus Boehner, 'The Notitia Intuitiva of Nonexistents According to 
William of Ockham," in Traditio 1 (1943): 223-75; and Anton Pegis, "Concerning 
William of Ockham," in Traditio 2 (1944): 465-80. For a discussion of Nicholas's 
place visk-vis Ockhamism, see Ernest A. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas 
of Autrecourt," Franciscan Studies 7:2 (June 1947): 127-60; and T. K. Scott, Jr., 
. "Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism," Journal of the History of Philose 
phy 9 (19'71): 15-41. 
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contemporaries. Yet with few exceptions, this has received virtually no
attention.3
In what follows I wish to take some small steps toward rectifying this
situation. My point of departure shall be to examine how Nicholas was
forced to address the question of the ontological status of motion in an
attempt to solve problems with the centerpiece of his anti-Aristotelian
critique, namely, his doctrine of the eternity of all things. This is of interest
because questions concerning the ontology of motion were generated from
tensions which the scholastics perceived to exist among Aristotle's diverse
statements concerning the relation of motion to the categories. The medie-
val debate over the ontology of motion, then, was a dispute among scholas-
tics of different stripes who shared a common Aristotelian framework.
Nicholas, however, abandoned this framework, adopted an atomistic theory
of matter and altogether dispensed with Aristotle's definition and classifica-
tion of motion. Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to weigh in on this issue. I
shall explain why this was so and argue that it was in Ockham's nominalistic
analysis of motion that Nicholas found the key to resolving problems in his
own critique of Aristotle. Thus, despite Ockham's stated intention of cor-
recting those errors destructive of Aristotelian philosophy, Nicholas was
able to use his work in what was one of the most rabid anti-Aristotelian
programs ever to arise in the Middle Ages.
Of course, all of this is of great importance for determining the impact
of Ockhamism on the course of late scholastic thought, especially for
evaluating its alleged corrosive influence. But it also raises questions about
the relation of nominalism to atomism generally. In reflecting on Nicholas's
use of Ockham it becomes clear that nominalism, insofar as it is driven by
a concern to limit the kinds of entities which are postulated as correspond-
ing to (categorematic) terms,4 provides a semantic and ontological analysis
3. The only comprehensive study of Nicholas's work is Julius R. Weinberg,
Nicholaus of Autrecourt: A Study in 14th Century Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1948). For Weinberg's treatment of Nicholas's views on motion,
see chap. 10, pp. 163-74. For a short general survey of Nicholas's thought, see J.
Reginald O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt," Mediaeval Studies
4 (1942): 97-125. The reader may also wish to consult Edward Grant, Much Ado
about Nothing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 74—77, for a brief
discussion of Nicholas's views on the vacuum.
4. Here I am indebted to Calvin Normore, who has analyzed the way in which
the appellations nominates and nominalistae were used in the twelfth through the
fifteenth centuries. He has shown that nominalism, as understood by the medievals
themselves, was not so much a doctrine about universals as it was a doctrine about
the truth conditions of sentences, particularly the kinds of entities which must be
postulated as corresponding to the categorematic terms of a sentence in order to
render it true. According to Normore, the medievals understood the division
between realists and nominalists with respect to this issue to be a division between
those who multiply entities as they multiply terms and those who restrict the
multiplication of entities as far as possible. See Calvin Normore, "The Tradition of
Medieval Nominalism," in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Wippel (Washing-
ton D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), pp. 201-17.
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which lends atomism both greater coherence and completeness. As we shall
see, atomism demands not only a nominalistic account of motion but also
a nominalistic account of both the microproperties of atoms and the macro-
properties of material bodies. If I am correct in this thesis, Nicholas's
alignment with Ockham will appear to be motivated not simply by the need
to solve problems associated with the doctrine of the eternity of things but
also by his recognition of the philosophical kinship which exists between
these seemingly disparate positions.5
I. THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD
AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTION
Nicholas begins his treatise Exigit ordo executionis by lamenting the fact that
some men have spent thirty or more years studying the works of Aristotle
and have learned no more than what could be learned in a very short time
by a direct study of nature.6 He complains that this excessive attention to
ancient writings has turned men away from that life of charity and concern
for the common good which is the duty of every Christian. To remedy this
situation, he proposes to show that the purported conclusions of Aristotle
have not been demonstrated and that, in almost every case, opinions op-
posed to these conclusions can be shown to be more probable. To this end
he puts forth his own doctrine of the eternity of all things as a direct
challenge to Aristotelian natural philosophy.7
5. I say this despite the fact that Ockham expended a great deal of energy in
attempting to refute indivisibilism. Like most fourteenth-century opponents of
indivisibilism, however, Ockham was not primarily concerned with physical indivisi-
bilism (the position which Nicholas held) but with mathematical indivisibilism. This
latter form of indivisibilism was developed in the context of solving problems
associated with the composition of continua, both spatial and temporal, and thus
dealt with such entities as points, lines, surfaces, and instants rather than with the
material atoms of Democritus or Epicurus. For an excellent overview of Ockham's
position on mathematical indivisibilism, see John E. Murdoch, "William of Ockham
and the Logic of Infinity and Continuity," in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and
Medieval Thought, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1982), pp. 165-206.
6. For a Latin text of the Exigit ordo executionis, see J. Reginald O'Donnell,
"Nicholas of Autrecourt," Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 179-280. Translations from
this and all other Latin texts cited in this article are my own. I am following
O'DonnelΓs pagination.
7. Here we should note that in the propositions Nicholas puts forth concerning
the eternity of all things, atomism and motion are not intended as demonstrated
conclusions but as propositions having greater probability than the conclusions of
Aristotle. Nicholas's aim, then, is not so much to build a new philosophical system
as it is to break the grip of Aristotelianism on the minds of his contemporaries so
that they may turn to more fruitful pursuits.
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The central thesis of this doctrine can be stated quite simply. Because
of the unique contribution which each thing (res)8 makes to the total and,
of necessity, unvarying degree of perfection in the universe, everything is
eternal and neither comes into being nor passes out of being. In Aristote-
lian terms, there is no generation or corruption in the universe, and though
there is motion, it is such that it involves no acquisition or loss of being. In
short, there is no passage whatsoever from nonbeing to being or from being
to nonbeing among things.
In the course of elaborating and defending this thesis, Nicholas finds
himself faced with the problem of reconciling it with the common experi-
ence of humanity.9 The problem is this: the assertion that there is no
generation or corruption in the universe seems to run afoul of our common
experience since it is most certainly within our experience that things come
into and pass out of being. I now see the color white in some object, but
then I cease to see it as the object becomes black. Is it not the case, then,
that there is at least one thing—this particular whiteness—that my experi-
ence tells me has ceased to exist and, hence, is not eternal? And could not
examples such as this be multiplied indefinitely?
In answering this objection, Nicholas points out that the inference
from the cessation of the appearance of whiteness to the cessation of its
existence can be made only on the following assumption: everything which
previously appeared to a sense but now does not appear, no matter what place the
sense directs its gaze upon, no longer exists.10 Nicholas contends, however,
that this assumption is indefensible since there are several explanations
which might account for the cessation of the appearance of whiteness
8. Certainly Nicholas means to apply the term 'thing' (res) to whatever has real
being, but he never specifies what it is that has real being. We might infer from the
fact that all of the examples he cites while expounding the eternity doctrine are
examples of substances and certain kinds of qualities that Nicholas follows Ockham
in holding these alone to be real. As we shall see, however, Nicholas's ontology was
not Aristotelian but atomistic. Hence, it may be that the term 'thing' is primarily
applicable to atoms themselves. See n. 15 for further discussion.
9. I am focusing on this objection rather than the proof for the eternity
doctrine because it is in the course of answering it that the problem of the ontologi-
cal status of motion arises. We might take note, however, of the following adumbra-
tion of the central proof for the eternity doctrine which Nicholas gives in the Exigit
"Everything whose present existence is for the good . . . of the entire multitude of
some whole which is itself always perfect to the same degree [semper aequaliter
perfecti], exists always. But this is true of this thing, for . . . it does not exist except
because its existence is good . . . and it is good for the whole multitude of beings
since the universe is an interconnected whole. . . . [Furthermore] the universe is
always perfect. Therefore this thing will always be" Exigit (p. 186). From this it is
clear that Nicholas sees the good of each individual thing as ordered to the good
of the entire universe. As he believes that the universe has an unchanging degree
of perfection, he concludes that no individual thing can be corrupted. If it were,
he argues, the total good of the universe would itself be diminished. For an
extended discussion of this proof, see Weinberg, Nicholaus of Autrecourt, pp. 127-48
10. For Nicholas's extended argument on this matter, see Exigit, pp. 198-200.
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but do not invoke the corruption of the quality itself. The most plausible
of these, he believes, is the following: "Natural forms [e.g., the accidental
form of whiteness] are divisible into minimum parts [minima] which, when
divided off from the whole, cannot perform their proper action. And so,
though they are seen when existing in the whole, they are not seen when
dispersed and divided or separated."11 That is, the smallest constituent
parts of a natural form are sensible when existing collectively, but when
separated from one another and existing individually they are insensible.
So while the form ceases to appear, all of its constituent parts remain.
And this, Nicholas believes, is sufficient to deny that any genuine cor-
ruption has taken place.
To clarify this argument we must note two things. First, although
Nicholas uses the term 'minimum parts' (minima), he makes it clear else-
where that the ultimate constituent parts of a substance and its accidents
are atoms (atomalia) .12 In light of his concern to defend the eternity doc-
trine, this is not at all surprising. The classical conception of atoms, of
which Nicholas is an advocate, is one of bits of matter which are un-
changing, indivisible, and indestructible—none of which can be said of
minima.13 Second, Nicholas reduces those changes which Aristotle char-
acterized as the generation and corruption of substances and their al-
teration through the generation and corruption of qualities to the
locomotion (congregation and dispersal) of atoms.14 It is easy to see the
11. Nicholas, Exigit, p. 199.
12. For instance, in an attempt to make sense of the Aristotelian distinction
between substance and accident, Nicholas writes, "There are [certain] atoms which
are such that upon their departure [from the subject], what is called the operation
of a thing no longer appears. . . . There are others which are such that upon their
departure, [these operations] do not go away. And these latter ought more properly
to be called the accidentals of a subject" (Exigit, p. 204). See also nn. 13 and 14.
13. Following Aristotle (Physics 187bl4-22), medievals generally took minima as
minimal homoeomeric parts sharing in the formality of that which they compose;
for example, the minima of flesh are the smallest units into which flesh can be
divided and remain flesh. That minimism was not really an option for Nicholas is
clear from the fact that minima were themselves considered to be divisible and
subject to loss of form when so divided. Any division of the minima of flesh would
yield something which is not flesh. Because of this, minima were clearly part of the
Aristotelian universe of generable and corruptible things. For a helpful discussion
of the medieval doctrine of minima, see Norma Emerton, The Scientific Reinterpreta-
tion of Form (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 76-105.
14. Nicholas uses the terms 'generation' and 'destruction' when referring to
the congregation and dispersal of atoms which constitute a substance, and he
distinguishes these from that to which the term 'alteration' is appropriately applied:
"When from some motion there follows a congregation of natural bodies which
gather together and receive the nature of a subject, this is called generation. When
they are separated, this is called destruction. When through locomotion there are
joined to a certain subject atomic particles of such a kind that their arrival seems
unrelated both to the movement of the subject and to what is called its natural
functioning, that is called alteration" (Exigit, pp. 200-1).
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motivation behind this thought. Since locomotion involves no generation
or corruption on the part of its subject, Nicholas believes that this re-
duction allows him to deny that change of any kind involves the genera-
tion or corruption of being.15 This is the key point which he wishes to
put forth against Aristotle.
Before the objection from common experience is completely dis-
missed, however, Nicholas finds that he must address a potential problem
concerning the ontology of motion. Immediately after invoking the disper-
sal of constituent atomic parts to explain the cessation of the appearance of
a substance and its accidents, Nicholas admits that his reasoning "does not
extend to motion, if motion is a thing distinct from the mobile, since unlike
other natural entities, it does not consist of permanently existing atoms that
can be dispersed."16 That is, if motion is itself a thing distinct from the
mobile, whether or not being is acquired or lost by or through it, it still
poses a problem for the eternity doctrine since its acquisition or loss cannot
be accounted for by the congregation or dispersal of atoms that compose
it. In this case the acquisition or loss of motion by the mobile would appear
to constitute, in direct violation of the eternity doctrine, the genuine gen-
eration or corruption of a thing. It is no surprise, then, that Nicholas
concludes that he must "investigate whether motion is distinct from the
mobile . . . before the end of the treatise."17 In short, he must investigate
the ontological status of motion.
Here Nicholas faces a choice. He must either construct a theory, in
addition to atomism, which will explain why, if motion is a distinct thing,
its acquisition and loss by the mobile does not constitute a genuine case
of generation or corruption, or he must deny that motion is a thing
distinct from the mobile. As we shall see, Nicholas opts for the latter
alternative. In doing so he enters into the lively debate on this issue which
had been raging among his colleagues at Paris and aligns himself with
the Ockhamist camp. In the next two sections we shall investigate both
the origins of this debate and Ockham's analysis of the problem. We shall
then turn back to Nicholas and examine the way in which he appropriates
Ockham's analysis.
15. There is, of course, a certain amount of ambiguity in this argument. At
times Nicholas seems to assume that the dispersal of atoms that constitute a sub-
stance or accident does not constitute the corruption of that substance or accident
because all of the substantial or accidental parts remain. Given this assumption, the
eternity doctrine embraces the eternity of substances and their accidents. At other
times, however, Nicholas seems to assume that while the substance or accident can
be said to be corrupted through the dispersal of its constitutive atoms, this does not
constitute genuine corruption (i.e., corruption of being) since those things which
have being primarily are the incorruptible atoms. Given this assumption, the eter-
nity doctrine embraces the eternity of atoms only.
16. Exigίt, p. 200.
17. Exigit, p. 200.
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II. MOTION AND THE CATEGORIES:
A SCHOLASTIC PUZZLE
The point of departure for a great many of the scholastic discussions of
the ontological status of motion is a passage from the opening of the third
book of Physics, in which Aristotle sets forth the relation of motion to the
categories.18
No motion exists apart from things; for that which changes always does
so either with respect to substance or with respect to quantity or with
respect to quality or with respect to place, and there can be no thing
common to these which is n o t . . . a this [i.e., substance] or a quantity
or a quality or some one of the other categories. Thus neither a motion
nor a change can exist apart from these [categories] if nothing else
exists but these.19
Here Aristotle makes it clear that motion exists only with respect to the
categories and cannot itself be considered a separate category into which
its particular types fall. On reading this text, many of the scholastics argued
that the basic types of change—generation and corruption, augmentation
and diminution, alteration, and locomotion—are properly placed within
the corresponding categories of substance, quantity, quality, and place.
Because generation or corruption, for example, are motions with respect
to substance, they fall in the category substance; similarly, for augmentation
and diminution, alteration, and locomotion.
As tidy as it might be, however, this interpretation is clouded somewhat
by an apparently conflicting passage from the Categoήes in which Aristotle
cites the process of being heated as an illustration of the category of
passion.20 This is particularly troublesome because this process is clearly an
instance of alteration. As such, if we follow the interpretation given above,
it should fall not in the category of passion but in the category of quality.
This puzzled many of the schoolmen, who realized that if Aristotle was
willing to treat alteration as a species of passion, other types of motion
might be so treated as well. And if that were the case, there would seem to
be direct conflict between what he says in Categoήes and what they took him
to be saying in Physics. Thus, the schoolmen found themselves confronted
with the double problem of harmonizing the Aristotelian texts both with
one another and with what they considered to be the truth of the matter.
In working out this puzzle, many took their lead from some remarks
made by Averroes. He, too, wondered about these problems and, in typical
18. The most comprehensive and authoritative discussion of the problem I
treat in this section is to be found in Anneliese Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und
Mechanik (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958), pp. 61-143.
19. Aristotle Physics 200b33-201a2.
20. Aristotle Categoήes llbl-8.
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scholastic fashion, tried to solve them by making a distinction. Commenting
on Physics, he writes,
Motion, insofar as it does not differ from the perfection to which it
proceeds [ad quam vadit] except according to greater and less, necessar-
ily belongs to the genus of that perfection. For motion is nothing other
than the generation, one part after another, of that perfection to which
that motion tends until the perfection is reached and is in act. . . .
However, according as it is a process towards a perfection [via adperfec-
tionem] which is distinct from the perfection itself, it is necessary that it
be in a genus per se, for a process to a thing is distinct from the thing itself.
According to this view, then, motion must be posited as a category per se.
And this way of speaking is more widely known, while the other is truer.
Thus, Aristotle introduced this more widely known way in the Categoήes,
and the other, truer way in this book [i.e., Physics] . 2 1
Averroes claims that motion can be considered in two ways. First, it can be
taken as the very form or perfection to which it tends, not insofar as that
form is actualized in a subject at rest relative to it, but insofar as that form
is progressively instantiated in its subject. Taken as such, motion must fall
under the same category as its terminus ad quern since it is nothing but that
terminus successively realized. Second, motion can be taken as the process
itself by which the form is realized. Taken as such, it is distinct from its
terminus and must be placed in a distinct category.22
Now we must realize that in this commentary Averroes is not simply
trying to answer an interpretative question. His identification of what he
takes Aristotle's meaning to be in Physics as the 'truer way' clearly indicates
his preference for identifying motion with its terminus and locating it within
the categories of substance, quantity, quality, and place. In this Averroes was
followed by many, though certainly not all, of the schoolmen. But no one
was to push this interpretation further than William of Ockham, who
wished to purge natural philosophy from any and all hypostasized concepts
of motion. It is to his analysis that we now turn.
III. OCKHAM, MOTION, AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PARSIMONY
In the Tractatus de successivis, Ockham aligns himself with Averroes's reading
of Physics and takes Averroes to have correctly understood that Aristotle did
not in any way intend to posit motion as a thing distinct from permanent
21. Averroes, Commentary on Aήstotle's Physics, bk. 3, c. 4, translated from the
Latin text cited in Maier, Zwischen Philosophie, p. 5.
22. We should note that elsewhere in his Commentary (bk. 5, comment 9)
Averroes identifies this category as the category of passion. See Maier, Zwischen
Philosophie, pp. 64-67.
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things {res permanentes)—in this case, the mobile body and the term of its
motion.2 3 To correct any possible misunderstanding, he writes,
In distinguishing two types of motion, [Averroes] does not mean that
motion can truly be taken in two ways, as if in one way it is the terminus
ad quern and in another it is the process differing from the terminus and
the moveable body. . . . Rather, he intends to express two opinions
concerning motion, of which one, the more famous, is false, and the
other is true.24
In this passage Ockham aligns himself with what he considers to be integral
Aristotelianism and takes aim at those who would posit motion as a process
or thing distinct from the subject or the term of motion. Such people, he
insists, are not only following the path of error but are straying from the
teaching of the master as well.25 To correct these errors, Ockham sets forth
his own analysis of motion, employing the full apparatus of his unique
logical and epistemological doctrine.
Ockham begins his analysis by dividing all change into two types: imme-
diate change (mutatio subita), in which form is acquired or lost in an instant,
and successive change (motus successivus), in which form is acquired or lost
successively. The first, which can be called motion only in a general sense (mo-
tus large), includes generation and corruption; the second, which is motion
in the proper sense (motusstήcte), includes augmentation and diminution, al-
teration, and locomotion. Ockham then sets out to show that in neither case
can motion be considered a thing distinct from its subject or its term. 2 6 In
23. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues I treat in this section, see Herman
Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:
Franciscan Institute, 1957), pp. 24-91.
24. Ockham Tractatus de successivis, ed. Philotheus Boehner (St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1944), p. 49. This work is not included in the Opera
Philosophica (hereafter OPh) of Ockham since it has been shown to be a compilation
of excerpts from others of Ockham's works on natural philosophy. See Boehner's
introduction to Tractatus.
25. The passage continues: "For some have said that motion is a thing differing
from the terminus a quo, the moveable body, and the terminus ad quern. . . . This was
the more famous opinion at the time of Aristotle. . . . The other was the true
opinion of Aristotle himself (Tractatus, p. 49).
26. In this context 'distinct from' refers to the real distinction, which, roughly
speaking, is the distinction existing between two things which can exist apart from
each other by the absolute power of God. The paradigm case of this distinction is that
between substances (e.g., Socrates and Plato), but the distinction was also extended
to that between matter and substantial form, as well as between substance and certain
kinds of accidents. Marilyn McCord Adams sets out Ockham's criterion of the real dis-
tinction as follows: "If x and y are really distinct created real things, neither of which is
part of the other, then it is logically possible that x should exist without y and logically
possible that)) should exist without x." Here we should note that for Ockham the logi-
cally possible is coextensive with that which falls under the absolute power of God. For
her discussion of the real distinction, see Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 16-19.
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what follows we shall pass over the discussion of immediate change and focus
on Ockham's treatment of change that involves succession, particularly loco-
motion, since it is this analysis which Nicholas picks up and uses for his own
purposes. Thus, when I use the term 'motion' from now on, I will be referring
to motion in the proper sense.
To understand Ockham's analysis it will be helpful first to consider
why those whom he takes as his opponents thought motion to be a thing
distinct from its subject and term. The first consideration is quite simple.
If two things are such that one remains while the other does not, they
are really separable and, hence, really distinct from each other. But the
subject and term of motion can remain after the subject ceases to move.
Motion, then, must be really distinct from both.27 Second, we should also
consider that the subject and term of motion are what were commonly
classified by fourteenth-century scholastics as permanent things (res per-
manentes). That is, they are entities whose parts are able to exist simulta-
neously with one another and have duration. A substance, for example,
which undergoes alteration from black to white, although undergoing
change, nevertheless has all of the parts which constitute it as a substance
at once; so, too, for the whiteness which is acquired by that alteration.
It is clear, however, that if motion is a thing, it cannot be a thing of this
kind since by its very nature its parts cannot exist simultaneously but
exist one after another. Ockham's opponents concluded from this argu-
ment that motion must be distinct from all permanent things, its subject
and term included, and must instead be considered a purely successive
thing (res pure successiva) . 2 8
Ockham, of course, thought this position to be completely ludicrous.
The very idea of a successive thing struck him as incoherent since he
believed it to entail that a being can be composed of parts which are
themselves nonbeings. His argument is simple. If motion is itself a suc-
cessive thing divisible into parts which exist successively, for any motion
which can be said to exist presently, each of its parts, except its present
part, will be either prior or posterior to the present. But parts prior or
posterior to the present cannot themselves be said to exist. Consequently,
for any motion which can be said to exist presently, that motion is com-
posed of parts which cannot be said to exist. As he took this to mean
that motion is a being composed of nonbeings, Ockham concluded that
the idea of a purely successive thing simply collapses into nonsense.
Ockham's argument here is really a reductio, designed to show the
27. This argument and the next are stated as objections to Ockham's answer to
the following question: Utrumpossit ratione sufβcienti quod motus importet aliud a rebus
permanentibus? See Ockham Questiones in libros physicorum Aήstotelis, Q.I 7 OPh 6, p.
436.
28. For a defense of this position, see Walter Burleigh, In Physicam Aήstot.
Expositio et Quaestiones IΠt.ll (Venice 1501, ff.64rb-65vb); and Walter Chatton,
Reportatio, 2.d.2, q. 1 (cod. Paris, ff.90rb-91va).
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absurdity of asserting motion to be a thing distinct from permanent
things.29 If motion is such a thing, the argument goes, it can only be a
successive thing. But the very idea of a successive thing is absurd. Therefore,
and so on. Now the argument seems clear enough, but what about the
thesis? If motion is not distinct from permanent things, does this mean that
it is itself a permanent thing? Ockham's answer is that it does not. In his
universe, only substances and qualities are permanent things, and motion
is neither. As Ockham's analysis proceeds, then, it becomes quite clear that
what is meant by this thesis is not that motion is itself a permanent thing
but simply that one need not posit any other thing besides permanent
things in order to account for it. To see how this works out, let us look at
the following analysis of locomotion:
From the fact that a body is first in A, no other thing than A [and
the body] is posited; similarly from the fact that that same body is not
first in B, no other thing than B and the body is posited; and again,
from the fact that that body is next in B, no other thing than B and
the body is posited. And proceeding in this way with regard to other
[places] it is clearly evident that besides a body and the parts of place
and other permanent things, it is not necessary to posit another thing
[to explain the locomotion of the body]. It is only necessary to posit
that the body is at a particular time in this place . . . and at another
time it is not.30
What we have here is a beautiful example of the way in which Ockham
applies to a physical problem his famous principle of parsimony: frustra
fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora (it is vain to do through more
what can be done through fewer). His point is to show that locomotion,
in this case the motion of a body from place A to place B, can be fully
accounted for without positing anything other than permanent things,
and certainly without positing motion as a distinct successive thing. For
a body to be in locomotion, it is sufficient merely that it successively oc-
cupy different places, do so without resting in any of the intervening
places, and do this continuously throughout the entire time it is consid-
29. Ockham's full argument is as follows: "If motion is a thing distinct from
permanently existing things, it is either divisible or indivisible. But according to [my
adversaries] it is not indivisible. Therefore it is divisible. Now it is either divisible by
virtue of having simultaneously existing parts, in which case motion has length,
breadth and depth, or by virtue of having parts which are not simultaneously
existing. [My adversaries] concede the latter but not the former. But the latter
cannot be said since that which does not exist cannot be a part of any existing being.
This is because no being is composed from non-beings. Thus, it cannot be said that
motion is some being other than permanent beings" (Summulaphilosophiae naturalis
3.5. OPh6, p. 262).
30. Ockham, Tractatus de successivis, pp. 45-46.
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ered to be in motion.31 No entities other than the body and the places
it occupies need be assumed, and to posit any would be superfluous.32
Ockham clearly wants to keep his ontology lean.
After driving this point home with numerous examples, Ockham turns
to the source of our confusion concerning concepts such as motion. Not
surprisingly, he locates it in confusions about language,33 and it is here
that the underlying nominalism of his analysis of motion becomes clear.
"It is imagined by many," he writes, "that just as there are distinct nouns,
so also are there distinct things corresponding [to each of these nouns]."34
This, he argues, is the source of a multitude of philosophical errors, in-
cluding the majority of errors in physics. To avoid them, we must realize
that many nouns are derived from verbs, adjectives, prepositions, and other
parts of speech and do not signify anything other than the words from
which they derive and the things signified by those words. Although such
nouns can be useful for stylistic purposes, for the sake of either brevity or
ornament, if we imagine that there is a distinct entity corresponding to
each of them, we will be led to embrace an ontology made up mainly of
hypostasized entities. To see the problem, consider the abstract noun
'simultaneity'. When used in the sentence 'There exists a simultaneity
between X and Y', this word seems to signify some entity distinct from X
and Y. But if we posit such an entity, we will be positing as real what is
merely hypostasized, for 'simultaneity' only expresses the fact that X and
Y exist simultaneously. And we need refer to no other entity besides X and
Y to account for this fact. If we realize this, we can avoid positing an
extraneous entity and keep our ontology lean.
Unfortunately, many of the abstract nouns derived from other parts of
speech are much more misleading than is 'simultaneity' and can lead to
31. Ockham writes, "Locomotion is simply this: first to be in one place, without
any other thing being posited; afterwards to be in another place, without any rest
intervening and without any other thing besides the place, the body and other
permanent things; and then to proceed continuously in like manner" (Tractatus de
successivis, p. 46). This last phrase 'and then to proceed continuously in like man-
ner' (sic continueprocendendo) is extremely important; it shows that Ockham consid-
ers motion to be continuous rather than discrete. See also Ockham Quaestiones in
libros Physicorum Aήstotelis Q. 22, OPh 6, pp. 452-53.
32. One may wonder whether Ockham is treating place here as a permanent
thing that the mobile acquires and loses through locomotion. The answer is no, for
Ockham follows Aristotle in defining place as the innermost surface of a containing
body (see Physics 210b32-212a30) and argues that the surface of a containing body
is not a thing really distinct from the body itself. From this he concludes that place
is not a distinct entity in its own right. For a further discussion, see Shapiro, Motion,
Time and Place, pp. 112-32.
33. For a detailed analysis of Ockham's application of his theory of language
to his physics, see Stephen Brown, "A Modern Prologue to Ockham's Natural
Philosophy," in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13.1),
ed. A. Zimmermann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), pp. 107-29.
34. Ockham, Tractatus de successivis, p. 46.
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quite serious philosophical problems. For this reason Ockham believes that
when doing philosophy it is better to avoid them altogether:
Because of the errors arising from the use of such abstract nouns, it
would be better for the sake of simplicity in philosophy not to use them,
but to use only verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, and syncate-
gorematics as they were primarily instituted. . . . Indeed, if it were not
for the use of such abstractions as 'motion', 'change', 'mutability',
'simultaneity', 'succession', 'rest' and others of this kind, there would
be few difficulties with respect to motion, change, time, instants and
other things of this kind.35
In short, though abstract nouns may add to the richness of language, they
can be lethal when doing philosophy.
Now what is interesting about this passage for our purposes is its identi-
fication of the term 'motion' as a derivative abstract noun, thus placing it on
par with the term 'simultaneity'. Here, Ockham believes, lies the primary
source of confusion. Those philosophers who posit motion as a thing distinct
from permanent things are, to put it in Wittgensteinian terms, bewitched by
language. Believing that there is a distinct thing corresponding to every
distinct noun, they take the term 'motion' to signify a thing distinct from all
other things signified by nouns not synonymous with it. Ockham contends,
however, that the term 'motion' was not invented to signify distinct things but
is employed for the sake of eloquence alone. Thus, we can not only express
all of our concepts perfectly well without using it but also we would be better
off if we abandoned its use altogether. All statements in which abstract nouns
such as 'motion', 'succession', and 'rest' occur ought to be translated or
resolved into statements that use such terms or expressions as 'it moves', 'it
succeeds', and 'it rests'.36 Carrying this resolution out, Ockham concludes,
This proposition 'motion is' does not denote that there exists some
thing signified through the term 'motion' which is distinct from all
other things, but rather [the following proposition] is understood:
That which is moved has some part and without intervening rest it will
have other parts of the same kind'. And from these it does not follow
that motion is something other than permanent things, but it follows
that that which is moved will have some permanent things beyond
those which it now has.37
35. Ockham Tractatus de successivis, p. 46-47.
36. Ockham writes, "Propositions in which such words as 'motion' [motus],
'movement' [motto], 'succession' [successio] 'successive thing' [successivum] and
other words of this kind are used ought to be resolved into propositions in which
such words as 'it is moved' [movetur], 'the moved' [motum], 'it succeeds' [succedit],
'succeeding thing' [succedens], and other words of this kind are posited" (Summula
philosophiae naturalis 3.7 OPh 6, p. 267).
37. Ockham Questiones in libros physicorum Aήstotelis Q. 17, OPh 6, p. 438.
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IV. NICHOLAS AND THE OCKHAMIST
ANALYSIS OF MOTION
Here we need only recall the problem with which we concluded our initial
discussion in order to see why Nicholas would find Ockham's analysis
attractive. In his attempt to dispense with the objection to the eternity
doctrine from common experience, Nicholas had either to explain why, if
motion is a distinct thing, its acquisition or cessation does not constitute
genuine generation or corruption or to deny that motion is a distinct thing.
Following Ockham's lead, Nicholas follows the second path. Two considera-
tions will be sufficient to see this choice.
In the section of the Exigίt devoted to motion, Nicholas announces that
he is primarily interested in investigating whether motion (by which he
means locomotion) is a thing distinct from the movable object. He begins
with the following observation: "It must be noted that, as someone says,
these names 'motion' [ 'motus'] or 'movement' ['motto'] were invented only
for ornamentation. Hence, if the propositions in which such names are
placed were resolved into their verbs, many difficulties, whether nominal or
real, would cease."38 This should now sound entirely familiar. Like Ockham,
Nicholas sees many of the problems surrounding motion as being due to
the insufficient attention philosophers pay to the diverse modes of linguistic
expression. More precisely, he locates the confusion concerning the on to-
logical status of motion as stemming from the fact that the noun 'motion'
is a kind of shorthand for a set of propositions, none of which imply that
motion is an entity. To say, for example, that a being has local motion is
really to say that a being moves locally, which in turn implies the following
three propositions:
(1) Between this body and some place there was previously an
intervening space.
(2) There is now an absence of an intervening space between this
body and that place.
(3) Now that this body is related to that place by an absence of an
intervening space, the parts of a contradiction [i.e., there is and is
not an intervening space between this body and that place] cannot
be verified.39
38. Exigit, pp. 223-24.
39. For the sake of greater consistency, I have slightly modified Nicholas's
wording of these statements by substituting 'place' for 'body' in the first statement.
The text reads as follows: "Hence, to say 'This being is moved locally' is the same as
to say all of the following: 'Between this body and another there was previously an
intervening space [medium]; now there is a negation of the intervening space; and,
now that the body is related to some place by the negation of the intervening space,
the parts of a contradiction cannot be verified'" (Exigίt, p. 224).
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Nowhere in these statements is motion posited as a positive entity distinct
from and inhering in the moving object. All that is posited is the movable
body, the places it occupies, and the negation of an intervening space.
Anything else is superfluous.40
Lest anyone still believe, however, that motion is a positive entity,
Nicholas issues the same charge as does Ockham. If motion is a positive
entity, it must be a successive entity, but to assert that it is a successive entity
is to assert something unintelligible.
I do not clearly understand, what my opponents mean by 'successive
being' unless they wish to say that for a successive being it suffices that
there be a nonbeing. But it does not seem intelligible that some positive
entity exist, and yet be composed of two parts of which it is true to say
of one that it has passed and is a non-being and of the other that it will
be in the future and is a non-being.41
In short, Nicholas finds the same problem with the doctrine of successive
being as does Ockham; it presupposes the absurd notion that a being can
itself be composed of nonbeings and winds up in utter incoherence.
With these two Ockhamistic lines of attack, Nicholas dismisses the view
that motion is a positive thing which is both inherent in the mobile and
distinct from it. This is of crucial importance because it affords him an
answer to the reformulated objection to the eternity doctrine. In short, the
cessation of motion cannot be counted as a cessation of the existence of any
positive or absolute entity. So if one asserts that motion is destroyed when
a thing comes to rest after having moved, the only meaning that one can
assign to this assertion which renders it true is that the movable object,
which previously was moving, is now not moving. But this, as Nicholas points
out, "can be so without the corruption of some positive entity."42
It is clear, then, that Nicholas's use of Ockham's analysis gave him a
convenient way of salvaging his eternity doctrine—the centerpiece of his
anti-Aristotelian attack—in the face of the objections drawn from common
experience. But we must remember that Ockham's analysis was neither
developed for this purpose nor part of a larger atomistic theory of motion.
Ockham, as he stressed over and over, wished to give an account of motion
in accordance with the intention of Aristotle (de intentione Aήstotelis). It is at
least a small irony, then, that this very account could be pressed into service
as part of what was perhaps the most vehement attack on Aristotelianism in
the Middle Ages. Yet beyond whatever irony we may find in this situation,
there is an interesting philosophical question. In looking at Nicholas's use
of Ockham, we might ask whether we find a merely accidental relation of
40. Nicholas writes, "I posit no such thing because it is not necessary, as has
been seen, nor even very intelligible" (Exigit, p. 224).
41. Exigίt, p. 224.
42. Exigit, p. 225.
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nominalism and atomism or whether some real philosophical kinship be-
tween the two is there displayed. In other words, should we see Nicholas's
adoption of the nominalist ontology of motion merely as a convenient
strategy by which to salvage the eternity doctrine, or should this alert us to
some intrinsic connection between atomism and nominalism of which
Nicholas may have been aware and which explains his reliance on Ockham?
It is to this question that we now turn.
V. ATOMISM AND NOMINALISM
In section I, I claimed that Nicholas's doctrine of motion (of all sorts) must
ultimately be understood in terms of atomism rather than minimism. This
is important, for medievals generally understood minima naturalia on the
hylemorphic model of material substance as form-matter composites. As
such, they were thought to be both susceptible to further division (though
they lose their form through such division) and capable of being subjects
of any number of qualities distinct from, yet inhering in, them. Nicholas,
however, aligned himself with the Democritean tradition in which the
ultimate constituents of material substances are taken to be atoms.43 Unlike
minima, Democritean atoms are supposed to be absolutely simple entities
incapable of physical, and possibly even theoretical, division.44 More impor-
tant, they are not supposed to have any manner of composition.
The doctrine of atomic simplicity, however, does not mean that atoms
are devoid of a plurality of properties. If we can trust Aristotle's account,
Democritus considered his atoms to be in ceaseless motion and to possess a
variety of sizes and shapes.45 Indeed, this variety is essential to the atomic
theory, for atomists believed that the particular properties of diverse material
bodies could not be explained merely by the diverse arrangements of their
43. This is the variety with which we should be most concerned since most of
what the medievals knew about atomism came from Aristotle's several discussions
of Democritus. For excellent general discussions of Democritean atomic theory, see
W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1965), pp. 389-99, and Richard McKirahan, Jr., Philosophy before Socrates
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), pp. 303-43.
44. It is a matter of scholarly debate whether Democritus took atoms to be
theoretically indivisible. For authoritative discussions of this issue, see Guthrie,
History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 503-7; David Furley, The Greek Cosmologists, vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 124-31; and Jonathan Barnes,
The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 352-60.
45. See Aristotle's account in Metaphysics 985b4; Physics 203a33, and On the
Heavens 303all-15. We might also note the famous claim by Aetius that "Democri-
tus specified two <basic properties of atoms>: size and shape; and Epicurus added
weight as a third" (DK 68A47). Quoted from McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates,
p. 308.
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constituent atoms; a diversity among atomic properties is needed as well.
Insofar as this is the case, I believe, atomism is bound not only to an essen-
tially nominalistic ontology of the macroproperties of material bodies but to
a nominalistic ontology of the microproperties of individual atoms as well.
The necessity of this becomes clear if we simply keep in mind that the atomist,
unlike the minimist, cannot take these microproperties to be in any way
distinct from the atoms in which they inhere. To do so would be to abandon
the doctrine of atomic simplicity. Thus, if the atomist is to give an account of
atomic properties, he or she must do so in a way which posits no distinction
between those properties and the atoms themselves. Before turning back to
the question of the status of motion, I will try to cash out this claim by a brief
examination of Ockham's and Nicholas's treatment of the properties of
dimensive quantity and shape. In this we shall see Nicholas's adaptation of
Ockham's nominalism as a necessary corollary to his atomism.
VI. NOMINALISM AND ATOMIC SIZE
Central to the atomist's position is the claim that atoms, unlike mathemati-
cal points, possess some determinate size or spatial magnitude. From the
Aristotelian perspective, one would say that they have, as do the material
bodies they compose, continuous quantity. But what, we might ask, is the
ontological status of continuous quantity? The answer one gets, of course,
depends on whom one asks. For example, because continuous quantity falls
in the general category of quantity, which is itself a category distinct from
that of substance, it was tempting for a great many of the medievals to treat
it as an accident distinct from the body in which it inheres.46 Whatever falls
in some one category, in this view, is a thing distinct from that which falls
in some other category. Such a view, it seemed to many, was not only the
most natural way of interpreting Aristotle's categoreal scheme but also was
reinforced by the observation of such phenomena as rarefaction and con-
densation, in which quantity was observed to be generated or corrupted but
not the underlying substance itself.47
Not surprisingly, this ontology was completely unacceptable to Ockham.
Against it he maintained that the distinction among categories does not
46. Aquinas and Scotus are two of the most prominent figures who held that
continuous quantity is a thing really distinct from substance and its qualities.
Anneliese Maier, however, has argued that Ockham is responding not so much to
them as to the arguments of Richard Middle ton. See her exhaustive analysis of this
entire problem in "Das Problem der Quantitat oder Raumlichen Ausdehnung," in
Metaphysiche Hintergrunde der Spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome: Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 1955), pp. 141-224.
47. For a discussion of the debate over rarefaction and condensation, see
Adams, William Ockham, pp. 178-86.
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necessarily correspond to a distinction among kinds of things but corre-
sponds instead to a distinction among kinds of names and modes of significa-
tion. The same thing, he argued, may be signified by categorically different
names, each of which signifies in a different way or by a different modus
significandiΛ8 Thus, the term 'quantity' need not signify a distinct thing from
that which the term 'substance' signifies. "I maintain that substance . . . and
quantity are distinct categories, although 'quantity' does not signify any
absolute thing distinct from substance For they are distinct concepts and
spoken sounds that signify the same things in different ways; and because
they signify them in different ways, they are not synonymous names."49 Ock-
ham elaborates, explaining that 'substance' signifies both the substance and
its parts directly, whereas 'quantity', while signifying the substance directly
insofar as it connotes that the parts of the substance are locally distant from
one another, signifies these parts obliquely. In a well-known passage from the
Summa totius logicae, Ockham spells out the consequences. Continuous per-
manent quantity, he writes, is "nothing other than a thing having part locally
distant from part [res una habenspartem situaliter distantem aparte] . . . [so that]
these two phrases 'continuous permanent quantity' and 'thing having part
distant from part' are equivalent in signification."50 Here the thing is signi-
fied directly through the use of the nominative case (res), whereas its parts are
signified obliquely as being locally distant from one another through the use
of the accusative and ablative cases (partem and a parte). In no way, then, is
continuous quantity signified as a distinct thing from that in which it inheres.
Ockham's concern for a lean ontology here is shared by Nicholas, who
repeats his arguments concerning quantity almost verbatim. "It does not
follow," Nicholas writes, "that because there are ten concepts [i.e., catego-
ries] , therefore there are ten things of which there are first these con-
cepts."51 These concepts may all signify the same thing. Thus, in answer to
the question of whether material substance simply is continuous permanent
quantity, Nicholas replies, "On the thing considered in itself or as related
to what are called its operations, the name 'substance' is imposed. But on
48. Here Ockham has in mind the difference between the way in which
absolute and connotative terms signify. An absolute term signifies its object directly
without indirectly signifying anything else, whereas a connotative term signifies
both its object directly and something else indirectly. For example, the absolute
term 'whiteness' signifies only the color, whereas the connotative term 'white'
directly signifies the thing that is white while also connoting its whiteness. Clearly
Ockham takes 'quantity' as a connotative term, which signifies a substance or
quality directly and connotes that their parts exist in a certain way. 'Substance', on
the other hand, is an absolute term. For further discussion of absolute and conno-
tative terms, see Adams, William Ockham, pp. 319-27.
49. Quodlibeta septem 4. q.27. OTh 9, p. 436.
50. A few lines down, Ockham concludes, "And thus, when a substance has part
locally distant from part, and similarly for a quality, then some quantity will not be
another thing from a substance, and some quantity will not be other than a quality"
(Summa totius logicae), 1.44. OPh 1, p. 137).
51. Exigit, p. 226.
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the same thing as having part outside of part [partem extra partem], the
concept of quantity is imposed."52 The relevant distinction, then, is not a
distinction among things but between the modus significandi belonging to
each term.
In making this claim, Nicholas shows himself a thoroughgoing Ock-
hamist concerning the relation of quantity to material substance. Indeed,
there is good reason for this, for what other ontology of quantity could an
atomist embrace? Insofar as a material body is composed of spatially ex-
tended atoms, it will itself be extended precisely in the sense of having part
distant from part. If one were to explain this extension by positing the
addition of some distinct property or accidental form of quantity, one would
either have to suppose this property or form to be something other than a
collection of atoms or not. In the first case, the ontology of atomism is
compromised; in the second, one simply lapses into incoherence. To avoid
these consequences, the atomist must embrace a nominalist ontology of
quantity with respect to the macroproperties of bodies.
The more interesting issue, however, may be that of the ontology of the
microproperties of atoms. How, for example, must the atomist view the spa-
tial magnitude of the atom itself? Nicholas gives us no answer, but it is reason-
able to suppose that he would continue to toe the Ockhamist line, for it yields
the only result compatible with his atomism, namely, the denial of a distinct
status for quantity. But here there is an obvious problem. Ockham's claim
that 'continuous permanent quantity' directly signifies a thing and obliquely
signifies its parts as locally distant from one another implies that that which is
signified by the term 'quantity' has parts. This does not seem terribly promis-
ing for those who would wish to hold on to the doctrine of atomic simplicity.
Perhaps this may not be so serious a problem as it first appears. Insofar as
atoms have spatial magnitude, there must be some sense in which they have
parts locally distant from parts, even if these are only theoretical parts. At the
very least, every section of the surface of an atom (however one might divide
it) must be considered locally distant from every other section of that sur-
face.53 As long as atoms are not taken to be mathematical points, it is hard to
see how an atomist could deny this. Even Epicurus, the great defender of
atomism against Aristotle, saw the need to posit minimum parts into which at-
oms could be theoretically divided in order to account for the fact of vari-
ation among the sizes and shapes of diverse atoms.54 Such parts, he argued,
52. Exigit, p. 226.
53. This may seem odd given that some or all of these parts would be contiguous
with one another. But here we must remember that to say that a thing has parts locally
distant from parts simply means that it has parts outside of parts (paries extra partes).
Contiguous parts of the surface of an atom would certainly be outside one another.
54. For relevant excerpts from Epicurus's Letter to Herodotus concerning the
doctrine of minimum parts, as well as commentary on those excerpts, see A. A.
Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 39-44. See also Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and
Epicurus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 284-89.
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are of an invariant magnitude such that a lesser magnitude cannot be con-
ceived. So while there is a lower limit to their theoretical divisibility, insofar as
atoms are not themselves minimum magnitudes, they can in theory be divided.
Given this one, seemingly necessary modification of the doctrine of atomic
simplicity, Ockham's ontology of quantity not only appears to be compatible
with atomism but also to provide the only viable account of atomic size.
VII. NOMINALISM AND ATOMIC SHAPE
However successful a nominalist analysis may be in accounting for the
property of size, it is not immediately clear that it can successfully be
extended to account for the property of shape. Shape, according to the
Aristotelian schema, falls not in the category of quantity but in that of
quality. Though Ockham denies that the distinction between quantity and
substance corresponds to a distinction among things, he makes no such
denial concerning quality: "There are certain things in the genus of quality
which constitute distinct things from a substance [quae important res distinc-
tas a substantial . . .just as 'whiteness' and 'blackness', 'color', 'knowledge',
'light', and things of this kind are not [substances]."55 Nevertheless, Ock-
ham exempts shape from this list, denying that there is a real distinction
between it and the subject in which it inheres. His reasons for doing so, I
believe, are most helpful in understanding the appeal which nominalism
might have for an atomist.
In the course of elaborating his criterion for distinguishing qualities
which are distinct things from those which are not, Ockham writes, "In
order to know when a quality must or must not be posited as a thing other
than a substance, it is convenient to use this method: when some predica-
bles can be successively, but not simultaneously, verified of the same thing
due to locomotion alone, it is not necessary that these predicables signify
distinct things."56
What Ockham is doing here is limiting a general criterion of distinc-
tion. Generally speaking, he believes that if two predicables can be succes-
sively, but not simultaneously, verified of the same thing, they can be
verified of that thing only through the generation of one and the corrup-
tion of the other.5 7 Thus, they must be distinct both from one another and
from that of which they are predicated.58 In the passage just cited, however,
55. Ockham Summa totius logicae 1.55. OPh 1, p. 180.
56. Ockham Summa totius logicae 1.55. OPh 1, p. 180. See also Quodlϊbeta septem
7, Q. 2. OTh 9, pp. 706-9.
57. We may put this as follows: For any two statements of the form 'S is P' and'S is
Q', if such statements can be true successively but not at the same time, they can only
be true if P is destroyed and Qis generated or Qis destroyed and P is generated.
58. Here we need only remember that a real distinction exists between any two
things that can exist apart from each other by the absolute power of God.
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Ockham limits the scope of this criterion by arguing that in some cases
predicables which are not simultaneously verifiable may be successively
verified by the locomotion of the substance as a whole or by its parts. In
these cases, no generation or corruption need be posited, nor should one
posit any distinction between the predicables and the subject of predica-
tion. This, he believes, is particularly clear in the case of shape.
Consider a straight line which becomes curved. Surely, Ockham argues,
one need not posit the destruction of some distinct quality, rectilinearity, and
the generation of another, curvilinearity, to explain this change. One need
only posit the locomotion of the parts of the line, namely, a motion by which
the parts become closer to one another. And since we have already seen that
nothing is generated or corrupted in locomotion, the qualities which stand
as the termini of the motion (rectilinearity and curvilinearity) need not be
posited as distinct from the subject in which they inhere.
It is obvious that this analysis would be attractive to atomists, for they
would be the first to agree that shape is not to be explained by the inher-
ence of some quality distinct from the body which is shaped. To posit
distinct qualities in order to account for either atomic shape or the shape
of a composite body would require them to introduce extra-atomic entities
into their ontology—a move they would surely reject. Furthermore,
atomists would find themselves in agreement with Ockham's explanation of
alteration with respect to shape byway of the rearrangement of the constitu-
ent parts of a body since this is the very explanation they put forward to
explain all forms of alteration, including change of color, temperature, and
even states of the soul. Hence we find Aristotle commenting that "Democri-
tus and Leucippus, having got the figures [i.e., the diversely shaped atoms],
get alteration and generation from these: generation and corruption by
their aggregation and segregation, alteration by their arrangement and
position."59 Certainly this extends explanation via the locomotion of parts
much further than Ockham takes it, but it nevertheless exhibits much of
the spirit that we find in his writings. In this way one can see atomism, at
least in its account of qualities, as not only aligned with but also as a more
radical form of the nominalism which Ockham develops. It is no wonder,
then, that in mounting an atomistic challenge to Aristotle, Nicholas would
find Ockham's work so congenial.
VIII. NOMINALISM AND ATOMIC MOTION
We are now in a position to complete our discussion of the ontology of
motion. Up to this point we have focused on Nicholas's account of the
59. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 315b6-8, trans. C. J. F. Williams
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
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motion of complex bodies and have seen how that account is used to solve
problems with the eternity doctrine. But now, so that we may extend the
results of the previous two sections, we turn to the ontology of the motion
of atoms themselves.
This problem is directly analogous to the one we encountered in our
discussion of dimensive quantity. In the universe of the classical atomist, all
that exists are atoms and the void through which they move.60 Thus, if
motion were a thing distinct from the individual atoms which are in motion,
it must itself be an atom or a composite of atoms. Nicholas, as we have
already seen, rejects the suggestion that motion might itself be a composite
of atoms. Though he does not explain himself, it is not difficult to see why
he would do this. If the motion of an atom or a composite body were itself
a distinct entity comprised of either one or more atoms, we could ask if it is
itself in motion when the atom or body whose motion it constitutes moves.
If we affirm that it is (and it would be ludicrous to suggest otherwise), we
are immediately caught in a regress. If the atom or atoms constitutive of the
motion of some atom or body are themselves in motion, there would be no
reason not to take that motion to be a distinct entity as well. Presumably,
then, we would have to explain that motion by way of other atoms, and the
same difficulties would simply reappear. Thus, at some point, the atomist
must deny the assumption that is driving the regress, namely, that motion
is an entity distinct from the mobile body. In short, if the atomist is to avoid
a regress in the explanation of motion on either the micro- or macrolevel
he or she will have to embrace a nominalist ontology. Even apart from his
concern to counter objections to the eternity doctrine, then, there now
appears to be good reason for Nicholas to embrace Ockham's analysis of
motion as a way in which to couch his own atomistic theory of motion. And
if pressed, he most likely would have extended that analysis to explain the
motion of individual atoms themselves. Once again, nominalism appears to
lend the atomistic ontology greater coherence and completeness.
IX. CONCLUSION
We may now take inventory of some results. First, we have placed Nicholas
in the context of scholastic debates concerning the ontology of motion and
have demonstrated his alignment with Ockham. In itself, this is of interest
since Ockham thought his analysis of motion to be in complete agreement
with the mind or intention of Aristotle. Yet Nicholas was able to use that
60. Nicholas, we should note, does not posit a vacuum separatum but a vacuum
inceptum. In this, he departs from the Greek atomists, who posited a separate void
through which atoms move. Here the authority of Aristotle seems to have held at
least partial sway over Nicholas's thought. See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, pp.
74-77.
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analysis to shore up problems with his eternity doctrine and its accompany-
ing atomistic worldview, both of which were constructed with the explicit
aim of showing views directly opposed to those of Aristotle to be more
probable than those which Aristotle purportedly demonstrated. If we take
scholasticism to be inextricably tied to Aristotelianism, we may see some
justification here for the often repeated charge that Ockhamism was the
fertile ground from which those forces destructive of scholasticism grew.
Second, though Nicholas's adoption of Ockham's analysis was intro-
duced to resolve problems with the eternity doctrine, its more fundamental
connection to his atomism is now apparent. As I have argued, in order to
give a coherent account of both the macroproperties of bodies and the
microproperties of atoms, atomists must either adopt a nominalist ontology
of properties or compromise their atomism by positing nonatomic entities.
Nicholas's writings present a clear picture of how the former works out in
the case of motion and quantity. And though he does not address the case
of shape, it is easy to complete the picture by examining Ockham's remarks
concerning change with respect to quality. So while we may not rank
Nicholas as one of the great constructive philosophers of the Middle Ages,
we must nevertheless consider his advocacy of atomism amid the controver-
sies over Ockhamism at Paris fortuitous insofar as it allows us to see this
philosophical kinship of nominalism and atomism. For this reason his work
deserves much greater attention than it has received.

